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A growing body of research demonstrates the importance of trust for economic outcomes. 1 Arrow (1974) In this paper we propose a model where the social network in ‡uences how much agents trust each other. Sociologists such as Granovetter (1985) , Coleman (1988) and Putnam (2000) have long argued that social networks play an important role in building trust. 2 In our model, networks create trust when agents use connections as social collateral to facilitate informal borrowing. The possibility of losing valuable friendships secures informal transactions the same way that the possibility of losing physical collateral can secure formal lending. 3 Since both direct and indirect connections can serve as social collateral, the level of trust is determined by the structure of the entire network.
Although we present our model in terms of trust over a borrowing transaction, it can also apply to other situations that involve moral hazard or asymmetric information, such as hiring workers through referrals. 4 To understand the basic logic of our model, consider the examples in Figure 1 , where agent s would like to borrow an asset, like a car, from agent t, in an economy with no formal contract enforcement. In Figure 1A , the network consists only of s and t; the value of their relationship, which represents either the social bene…ts of friendship or the present value of future transactions, is assumed to be 2. As in standard models of informal contracting, t will only lend the car if its value does not exceed the relationship value of 2. More interesting is Figure 1B , where s and t have a common friend u, the value of the friendship between s and u is 3, and that between u and t is 4. Here, the common friend increases the borrowing limit by min [3; 4] = 3, the weakest link on the path connecting borrower and lender through u, to a total of 5. The logic is that the intermediate agent u vouches for the borrower, acting as a guarantor of the loan transaction. If the borrower chooses not to return the car, he is breaking his promise of repayment to u, and therefore loses u's 1 Trust has been linked with outcomes including economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1997) , judicial e¢ ciency and lack of corruption (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997), international trade and …nancial ‡ows (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2008) , and private investment (Bohnet, Herrman, and Zeckhauser 2008) . 2 Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000) show in experiments that social connections increase trust. Field evidence on the role of networks in trust-intensive exchange includes McMillan and Woodru¤ (1999) and Johnson, McMillan, and Woodru¤ (2002) for business transactions in Vietnam and transition countries; Townsend (1994) and Udry (1994) for insurance arrangements in India and Nigeria; and Macaulay (1963) and Uzzi (1999) for …rms in the U.S. 3 We abstract from morality, altruism and other mechansisms that can generate trust even between strangers (e.g., Fukuyama (1995) , Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) ); hence our de…nition of trust is like Hardin's (1992) . 4 In related work, Kandori (1992) , Greif (1993) and Ellison (1994) develop models of community enforcement where deviators are punished by all members of society. More recently, Ali and Miller (2008) , Bloch, Genicot, and Ray (2005) , Dixit (2003) and Lippert and Spagnolo (2006) explore models of informal contracting where networks are used to transmit information. In contrast, in our work the network serves as social collateral.
friendship. Since the value of this friendship is 3, it can be used as collateral for a payment of up to 3. For the lender t to receive this amount, u must prefer transmitting the payment to losing the friendship with him, explaining the role of the weakest link.
Our main theoretical result is that in general networks, the level of trust equals the sum of the weakest link values over all disjoint paths connecting borrower and lender. This quantity is called the maximum network ‡ow, a well-studied concept in graph theory. 5 Intuitively, the maximum ‡ow is the highest amount that can ‡ow from borrower to lender along the edges of the network, respecting the capacity constraints given by link values. This concept does not require the borrower and the lender to be directly linked; for example, in Figure 1C , where s and t are not connected but share two common friends, the borrowing limit is the sum of the weakest links on the two paths connecting s and t, min [3; 4] + min [2; 1] = 4, because both intermediate agents can vouch for part of the value of the car. The key idea in the proof of our main result is to characterize coalition-proof informal contracts using the maximum ‡ow-minimum cut theorem (Ford and Fulkerson 1956 ), a famous result in computer science.
The paper also develops three applications of this social collateral model. The …rst application, which explores the e¤ect of network structure on welfare, helps reconcile two seemingly competing views by sociologists. Coleman (1988) emphasizes the bene…ts of networks with high closure, where connected agents share many common friends, which facilitate the enforcement of cooperation. In contrast, Burt (1995) argues that loose networks, i.e., low closure, are better, because they provide greater access to information and other resources. The social collateral model can reconcile these views by identifying a trade-o¤ between trust and access, which implies that the relative bene…t of high or low closure depends on the value of the assets being transacted. Closure is more attractive when agents tend to exchange valuable assets, because it maximizes trust among a small number of individuals. This is in line both with Coleman's general argument and with his example of diamond dealers in New York, who exchange valuable stones in a tight network of family and religious ties.
In contrast, when the network is mainly used to exchange small favors such as giving information or advice, large and loose neighborhoods are better because they maximize access to these resources.
These results also provide foundations and network-based measures for Putnam's (2000) concepts of bonding versus bridging social capital, and have implications for the design of organizations.
In a second application, we study the implications of network-based trust for job recommendations. It is well known that many jobs are found through social networks (Ioannides and Loury 2004) . A common explanation is that information about job openings spreads through friends and acquaintances. This "strength of weak ties" argument, made by Granovetter (1973) , predicts that weak links to agents with whom one has few common friends are most useful for job search, because they provide access to otherwise unobtainable information. However, the evidence 5 See Cormen, Leiserson, Rivest, and Stein (2001) for a textbook treatment.
is mixed: many studies …nd that strong ties in dense networks are more important.
Our model suggests a reason for the strength of strong ties in job search: trusted recommenders can reduce asymmetric information about job candidates. In the social collateral model, networks do help identify high type workers, but only if the trust ‡ow between the recommenders and the employer exceeds the sensitivity of pro…ts to worker type. Recommendations from less trusted individuals are not credible, because a low type candidate can "bribe" the recommender to put in a good word for him. This result implies that the relative importance of weak versus strong connections should vary as a function of the skill-sensitivity of the job, which can help explain the mixed evidence about weak ties. We also obtain new predictions: agents hired through the network should earn higher wages; this wage gap should be increasing in the skill intensity of the job; and employers should rely more on social networks to …ll skill-intensive vacancies. While these predictions do not emerge in a model of information transmission about vacancies, they are consistent with existing evidence, suggesting that trusted referrals can be important for understanding job search.
In the third, empirical application, we estimate and test our model using a unique dataset on social networks and informal lending in two low income shantytowns in Peru. In these communities, informal borrowing is very common, making the data an ideal …t for our theory. For example, 46 percent of households have recently borrowed money from others in their immediate social network.
We estimate the social collateral model in this data using a discrete choice framework, which allows us to back out the relative strength of network links as a function of time spent together, and establish three results. (1) Con…rming our main prediction, we document a strong positive correlation between social collateral and borrowing that is primarily driven by strong ties. For example, increasing trust ‡ow by a link in the top one-third of the distribution of time spent together increases the probability of borrowing by a factor of 2:7. (2) We show that direct and indirect paths have similar e¤ects on borrowing, demonstrating the importance of network closure for building trust. (3) We verify the key structural implication that borrowing should be determined by the weakest link on a path. Our results are inconsistent with alternative explanations such as altruism or information transmission, which do not predict that indirect paths should matter through the value of the weakest link. Taken together, we …nd strong support for the social collateral model; our results also suggest that strong ties and high closure, i.e., bonding social capital, are particularly important for borrowing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 collects motivating evidence about the social collateral mechanism. Section 2 develops the model and derives the reduced form expression for trust. Section 3 presents our theoretical applications and Section 4 our empirical application.
Section 5 concludes by sketching some other applications. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Social collateral: suggestive evidence
This section presents evidence about social networks and informal contract enforcement. It is a well-documented fact that social networks are often used for trust-intensive exchanges. 6 In this section, we focus on documenting anecdotal evidence about the mechanism through which networks create the trust necessary for these transactions.
We begin with an example originally attributed to Wechsberg (1966) , which we take from Coleman (1990) . This example is about a prominent Norwegian shipowner who was in need of a ship that had undergone repairs in an Amsterdam shipyard. However, "the yard would not release the ship unless a cash payment was made of 200,000 pounds. Otherwise the ship would be tied up for the weekend, and the owner would lose at least twenty thousand pounds." The shipowner was in trouble, because he could not have 200,000 pounds delivered immediately to Amsterdam. To solve this problem, he called a London banker at Hambros, who presumably had contacts in Amsterdam.
After hearing the situation, "the Hambros man looked at the clock and said, 'It's getting late but I'll see whether I can catch anyone at the bank in Amsterdam ... stay at the phone.'Over a second phone he dictated to a secretary in the bank a telex message to the Amsterdam bank: "Please pay 200,000 pounds telephonically to (name) shipyard on understanding that (name of ship) will be released at once."
In this example, the shipowner borrowed 200,000 pounds on immediate notice from an Amsterdam bank with which he had no direct connection. He accomplished this by collateralizing two business relations: his connection with the London banker, and the connection between the London and Amsterdam banks. In Coleman's (1990) terminology, the London banker acted as a "trust intermediary": by vouching for the shipowner, he provided access and created the necessary trust for the transaction. If the shipowner were to default, the Amsterdam bank could ask the London banker to pay compensation or risk jeopardizing their relationship; and similarly, the London banker could presumably extract money from the shipowner if needed. This is how the two business relations were used as collateral to secure borrowing.
A second example of the mechanism through which networks generate trust is the guanxi system in China. Guanxi refers to a trusted relationship that can be used to obtain services either directly or indirectly from that person's social network. 7 Guanxi often serves as a substitute for legal contracts, and helps overcome institutional weaknesses of the Chinese legal system (Fock and Woo 1998) . To understand the mechanism of guanxi, consider Standi…rd and Marshall's (2000) example of a buyer and a seller who share guanxi with a common acquaintance. This third person 6 For references, see the citations in footnote 2, as well as Table 1 in our working paper, . 7 The original meaning of the phrase "guan-xi" is using relationships to gain indirect access to a wider network. "Guan" means gate or hurdle and "xi" refers to a relationship; guanxi is thus a gateway to other relationships.
can act as zhongjian ren, essentially an intermediary, by introducing the buyer to the supplier.
In this transaction, the zhongjian ren vouches for the buyer by assuring the supplier that he will be compensated for any sunk investments required for the relationship (e.g., preparing blueprints or samples). If the buyer exploits the supplier, the intermediary will be held responsible; and unless reparations are made, this can damage the relationship between the intermediary and either business partner. This example illustrates the collateral role of guanxi: parties refrain from cheating because it would limit their future exchange with the intermediary whose guanxi they borrowed.
Both of these examples highlight the role of vouching intermediaries and the collateral function of connections in securing transactions. We now develop a model that formalizes these ideas.
Theory
This section presents a game-theoretic model of informal borrowing in social networks, and shows that the highest loan amount is limited by the maximum network ‡ow (or trust ‡ow ) between borrower and lender. In Sections 3 and 4, where we consider applications, we make use of this reduced form characterization of trust.
Model setup
In our model, a borrower needs the asset of a lender to produce social surplus. This asset might represent a factor of production, such as a farming tool, a vehicle or an animal; it could also be an apartment, a household durable good or simply a cash payment. In the absence of legal contract enforcement, borrowing must be secured by an informal arrangement. In our model, the social network is used for this purpose: connections in the network have associated consumption value, which serve as "social collateral" to enable borrowing.
Formally, a social network G = (W; E) consists of a set W of agents (vertices or nodes) and a set E of edges (links), where an edge is an unordered pair of distinct vertices. Each link in the network represents a friendship or business relationship between the two parties involved. We formalize the strength of relationships using an exogenously given capacity c(u; v).
De…nition 1 A capacity is a function c : W W ! R such that c(u; v) > 0 if (u; v) 2 E and c(u; v) = 0 otherwise.
The capacity measures the utility bene…ts that agents derive from their relationships. For ease of presentation, we assume that the strength of relationships is symmetric, so that c (u; v) = c (v; u) for all u and v. 8 Our model consists of …ve stages, which are depicted in Figure 2 . We begin by describing the model, and then discuss the economic content of our modeling assumptions.
Stage 1: Realization of needs. Two agents s and t are randomly selected from the social network. Agent t, the lender, has an asset that agent s, the borrower, desires. The lender values the asset at V , and it is assumed that V is drawn from some prior distribution F over [0; 1). The identity of the borrower and the lender as well as the value of V are publicly observed by all players.
Stage 2: Borrowing arrangement. At this stage, the borrower publicly proposes a transfer arrangement to all agents in the social network. The role of this arrangement is to punish the borrower and compensate the lender in the event of default. A transfer arrangement consists of a set of transfer payments h (u; v) for all u and v agents involved in the arrangement. Here h (u; v) is the amount u promises to pay v if the borrower fails to return the asset to the lender. Once the borrower has announced the arrangement, all agents involved have the opportunity to accept or decline. If all involved agents accept, then the asset is borrowed and the borrower earns an income ! (V ), where ! is a non-decreasing function with ! (0) = 0. If some agents decline, then the asset is not lent, and the game moves on directly to stage 5.
Stage 3: Repayment. Once the borrower has made use of the asset, he can either return it to the lender or steal it and sell it for a price of V . 9 If the borrower returns the asset then the game moves to the …nal stage 5.
Stage 4: Transfer payments. All agents observe whether the asset was returned in the previous stage. If the borrower did not return the asset, then the transfer arrangement is activated.
Each agent has a binary choice: either he makes the promised payment h (u; v) in full or he pays nothing. If some agent u fails to make a prescribed transfer h (u; v) to v, then he loses his friendship with agent v (i.e., the (u; v) link "goes bad"). If (u; v) link is lost, then the associated capacity is set to zero for the remainder of the game. We let e c (u; v) denote the new link capacities after these changes.
Stage 5: Friendship utility. At this stage, agents derive utility from their remaining friends.
The total utility enjoyed by an agent u from his remaining friends is simply the sum of the values of all remaining relationships, i.e., P v e c (u; v). Our model is a multi-stage game with observed actions. Let u denote the set of agent u's pure strategies and let = u u . We focus on the set of pure strategy subgame perfect equilibria below.
Discussion of modeling assumptions
We now discuss some of the assumptions underlying our model. 9 As we show in Appendix B, the model can be extended to the case where the liquidation value of the asset is V with 1.
Social sanctions. When an agent fails to make a promised transfer, we assume that the associated friendship link automatically goes bad, capturing the idea that friendly feelings often cease to exist if a promise is broken. Appendix B develops explicit micro-foundations for this assumption. In these microfoundations, which build on Dixit (2003) , failure to make a transfer is a signal that the agent no longer values his friend, in which case these former friends …nd it optimal not to interact with each other in the future. An alternative justi…cation is that people break a link for emotional or instinctive reasons when a promise is not kept; Fehr and Gachter (2000) provide evidence for such behavior.
Circle of trust. For large social networks it can be unrealistic for the borrower to include socially distant agents in the arrangement. All our results hold if we restrict the set of links over which transfer payments can be proposed to some subgraph of the original network, the "circle of trust," which may depend on the identity of the borrower and the lender. The only di¤erence in our results is that the network ‡ow measure of the borrowing limit will have to be computed in the subgraph of permissible links.
Transfer arrangement as social norms. The transfer arrangement in our model can be interpreted either as an explicit agreement between all parties or as the representation of accepted norms of behavior. In the second interpretation, agents simply share an understanding about what they are expected to do in the event of default.
Cash bonds and borrowing constraints. One way to solve the moral hazard problem is to have the borrower post a cash bond to the lender, which is only returned if the borrower does not default on the asset loan. We abstract away from bonds and pre-payments by assuming that the borrower is initially cash-constrained. However, we do allow the borrower and other agents to make payments in later stages of the game. This can be justi…ed if agents work or make investments in the initial stage, generating income in later stages; or if transfers are in-kind, e.g., helping out with the harvest, where posting a bond may be ine¢ cient or infeasible.
Equilibrium analysis
For what values of V can borrowing be implemented in a subgame perfect equilibrium? We begin answering this question by studying equilibria where all promises are kept, i.e., where every transfer h (u; v) is expected to be paid if the borrower fails to return the asset. We later show that focusing on these equilibria is without loss of generality. In any equilibrium where promises are kept, transfers have to satisfy the capacity constraint
This is simply an incentive compatibility constraint. If the borrower fails to return the asset, agent u has to decide whether to make his promised transfer payment h (u; v) to v. The cost of making the payment is h (u; v); the cost of not making the payment is c (u; v), because it results in losing the friendship with v. In any equilibrium where promises are kept, u must prefer the friendship over the monetary value of the transfer, leading to (1).
Two-agent network. To build intuition, we begin the equilibrium analysis with the case where the social network consists only of the borrower s and the lender t. Let be a pure strategy subgame perfect equilibrium implementing borrowing where promises are kept. In any such equilibrium, V h (s; t). To see why, assume that the borrower s defaults on the equilibrium path. Then the lender receives the transfer payment h (s; t) instead of the asset; but he must break even to lend, which yields V h (s; t). On the other hand, if the borrower returns the asset on the equilibrium path, then he must weakly prefer not to default, which again requires V h (s; t). Combining this inequality with the capacity constraint (1) then yields
showing that borrowing is limited by the maximum ‡ow in this simple network. It is also easy to see that when (2) is satis…ed, there exists an equilibrium that implements borrowing: just set h (s; t) = V . 10 Intuitively, the collateral value of friendship can be used to elicit payment and thus solve the agency problem.
Four-agent network. To gain intuition about borrowing in more general networks, we next consider the network depicted in Figure 3 , which consists of four players: the borrower s, the lender t, an intermediate agent u connecting s and t, and agent v who is only connected to the borrower s. We will refer to v as the "cousin"of s. A natural transfer arrangement that implements borrowing in this network is one where agent u acts as an intermediary who elicits and transits payments from s to t in the case of no compliance, and gets zero net pro…ts. To formalize this arrangement, simply set h (s; u) = h (u; t) = V . For this arrangement to be incentive compatible, the capacity constraint (1) must be satis…ed for both links involved: V c (s; u) must hold so that s delivers the transfer to u, and V c (u; t) is needed to ensure that u passes on the transfer to t.
Combining these yields the "weakest link" inequality
which implies that the maximum ‡ow determines the borrowing limit in this transfer arrangement.
However, networks with more than two agents generally admit other subgame perfect equilibria that can implement borrowing even if (3) fails. We argue that these equilibria are implausible, because they fail a natural coalition-proofness requirement. To illustrate, assume that the borrower s has a strong link to his cousin v, with a capacity value of c (s; v) = V + 1. The borrower might then propose an informal arrangement in which he promises to pay his cousin a transfer of h (s; v) = V + 1 in case he fails to return the asset. This arrangement provides the right incentives to the borrower, and is a subgame perfect equilibrium even if (3) fails. To understand its logic, note that in this arrangement, the borrower essentially makes the following proposal to the lender: "Lend me your asset; if I don't return it to you, my cousin will be angry with me."As this interpretation makes it clear, this borrowing arrangement may not be robust to joint deviations where both the borrower and his cousin depart from equilibrium. More concretely, the borrower could circumvent the arrangement by entering a side-deal with his cousin, in which he steals the asset and shares the proceeds with the cousin (who in equilibrium would otherwise receive nothing). Due to the possibility of such side-deals, we do not …nd this equilibrium plausible.
A similar potential equilibrium is one where the intermediate agent u provides incentives to the borrower but promises a zero transfer to the lender. In this case, the lender e¤ectively "outsources" monitoring to the intermediary, trusting that the borrower will always return the asset rather than pay a high transfer to u. This arrangement is again open to side-deals: here s and u can choose to steal the asset jointly and split the proceeds, leaving the lender with nothing. As in the equilibrium with the cousin, the possibility of a side-deal arises because nobody "monitors the monitorer": the lender is not fully in control of incentives. When enforcement is outsourced to either the cousin or the intermediary, these agents can "team up" with the borrower and steal the asset.
These examples suggest that when the borrower and other agents can agree to side-deals, it may not be in the interest of the lender to provide the asset. This motivates our focus on subgame perfect equilibria that are immune to such side-deals.
Side-deal proof equilibrium
Consider the subgame starting in stage 2, after the identities of the borrower and the lender and the value of the asset are realized, and for any pure strategy 2 , let U u ( ) denote the total utility of agent u in this subgame. We formalize the idea of a side-deal as an alternative transfer arrangement e h (u; v) that s proposes to a subset of agents S W after the original arrangement is accepted.
If this side-deal is accepted, agents in S are expected to make transfer payments according to e h, while agents outside S continue to make payments described by h. In order for the side-deal to be credible to all participating agents, it must be accompanied by a proposed path of play that these agents …nd optimal to follow. This motivates the following de…nition.
De…nition 2 A side-deal with respect to a pure strategy pro…le is a set of agents S, a transfer arrangement e h (u; v) for all u; v 2 S, and a set of continuation strategies fe u ju 2 Sg proposed by s to agents in S at the end of stage 2, such that
Condition (i) says that all agents u involved in the side-deal are best-responding on the new path of play, i.e., that the proposed path of play is an equilibrium for all agents in S conditional on others playing their original strategies S . Condition (ii) says that if any agent u 2 S refuses to participate in the side-deal, then play reverts to the original path of play given by . Finally, (iii) ensures that the borrower s strictly bene…ts from the side-deal.
De…nition 3 A pure strategy pro…le is a side-deal proof equilibrium if it is a subgame perfect equilibrium that admits no side deals.
It is easy to see that this condition rules out the equilibria violating the weakest link inequality (3) in Figure 3 . We now turn to extend this result to general networks. 11
Main theorem
We begin by formally de…ning the concept of network ‡ows intuitively discussed above.
De…nition 4 An s ! t ‡ow with respect to capacity c is a function f : G G ! R that satis…es
(ii) Capacity constraints: f (u; v) c(u; v).
The value of a ‡ow is the amount that "leaves"the borrower s, given by jf j = P w f (s; w): Let T st (c) denote the maximum value among all s ! t ‡ows.
Theorem 1 There exists a side-deal proof equilibrium that implements borrowing between s and t if and only if the asset value V satis…es
This result states that the endogenous borrowing limit equals the value of the maximum ‡ow between borrower s and lender t. We interpret the borrowing limit T st (c) as a measure of networkbased trust: if s can borrow more from t, it must be that t has higher trust in s.
The logic of the proof of Theorem 1 is as follows. When V satis…es inequality (4), a side-deal proof equilibrium is easy to construct: by assumption, there exists an s ! t ‡ow with value V , and this ‡ow can be used as a transfer arrangement. Flow conservation implies that all intermediate agents break even, con…ning their role to simply extracting and transmitting the payment V from s to t in case s fails to return the asset. Thus the lender is in full control of incentives; because of this, the equilibrium is easily seen to be side-deal proof.
To show that no side-deal proof equilibrium can implement a higher level of borrowing, we build on the maximum ‡ow-minimum cut theorem (Ford and Fulkerson 1956) , which states that the maximum network ‡ow between s and t equals the value of the minimum cut. A cut is a disjoint partition of the nodes into two sets G = S [ T such that s 2 S and t 2 T , and the value of the cut is de…ned as the sum of c (u; v) for all links such that u 2 S and v 2 T .
For any borrowing arrangement violating (4), we can construct a side-deal the following way.
Fix a minimum cut (S; T ); the maximum ‡ow-minimum cut theorem implies that the total capacity of all links between S and T is less than V . But then agents in S have a pro…table side-deal: by defecting as a group, they lose less than V in foregone friendships, but gain V from selling the asset. For a concrete example, consider the network with the cousin in Figure 3 and suppose that c (s; u) < c (u; t). The minimum cut between s and t has value c (s; u), and the corresponding partition is simply S = (s; v) and T = (u; t). In any equilibrium where V > c (s; u), i.e., where (4) is violated, agents in S have a side-deal: the borrower s and his cousin v can team up to steal the asset, because their total repayment is limited by the value of the cut c (s; u).
Extensions: transfer constraints and endogenous circle of trust
Transfer constraints. In environments with credit constraints, agents might have limits on the total amount they can borrow or transfer. For example, in Figure 4A , the intermediaries u and v might worry that if the borrower s carries too large a debt burden, he will be unable to pay. We show that the concept of network ‡ows can be used to characterize borrowing in this environment as well. To introduce borrowing and transfer constraints in a simple way, suppose that each agent u can make a total payment of at most k u to others in the network, where the "transfer constraints" k u are exogenous. Here k u can represent either cash-or time-constraints. 12
How much borrowing can be implemented in this environment? We show that the answer is given by the maximum ‡ow in a modi…cation of the social network, where each agent u is replaced by two identical agents connected by a link with capacity k u . To formally construct this auxiliary (directed) network G 0 , replace each node u in G with a pair of two nodes, u 1 and u 2 , and replace each (u; v) link with two new directed links: a u 2 ! v 1 link and a v 2 ! u 1 link, both with capacity equal to c (u; v). Finally, for each agent u, create a new u 1 ! u 2 link with capacity equal to the transfer constraint c (u 1 ; u 2 ) = k u . That is, we duplicate all agents u, point all incoming links of u to u 1 , have all outgoing links of u originate in u 2 , and let the capacity of the u 1 ! u 2 link be k u .
For example, consider the network in Figure 4A where agent s faces a binding transfer constraint of 3:5. The corresponding auxiliary network is drawn in …gure Figure 4B and we can deduce that the constrained network ‡ow equals 3:5, the ‡ow from agent s 1 to agent t in the auxiliary graph.
In the Appendix we show that in any side-deal proof equilibrium where promises are kept, the borrowing limit in the presence of transfer constraints equals the value of the maximum s 1 ! t 1 ‡ow in G 0 . To understand the intuition, consider a maximal ‡ow. As in the basic model, the amounts assigned to links between agents by this ‡ow can be interpreted as the transfer payments in a candidate transfer arrangement. It remains to verify that, in this arrangement, no agent u exceeds his total transfer constraint k u . But this follows by construction of G 0 . The total transfers promised by u must be equal to the ‡ow leaving u 2 in G 0 ; but by ‡ow conservation, this must be equal to the value carried over the u 1 ! u 2 link, which is bounded by the link capacity of k u in G 0 .
Circle of trust. We can endogenize the "circle of trust," i.e., the set of permissible links over which transfer arrangements can be proposed, by assuming that there is a …xed cost associated with proposing various transfer arrangements. For each subgraph G 0 G, let (G 0 ) 0 denote the cost of a transfer arrangement that includes all links in G 0 . 13 Assume that is monotone in the
The function can be interpreted as a characteristic of the community's social norm; for example, in a kin-based society, we expect to be zero or small for most family and relative links.
Agent s, who wishes to borrow V from t, must now solve the cost-minimization problem
is the trust ‡ow between s and t in G 0 . The solution G 0 , if it exists, is the minimum cost subgraph where borrowing V can still be supported.
Agent s then chooses to borrow if and only if his pro…t from the loan exceeds the cost, i.e., ! (V ) (G 0 ). Besides its added ‡exibility, this framework also yields two new implications.
(1) The set of people involved in an arrangement is endogenously determined: the greater the pro…ts ! (V ), the more the borrower is willing to extend his circle of trust. 14 (2) With positive , agents only borrow when pro…ts are high enough; assets that generate low returns are never secured through social collateral.
1 3 For two networks G = (W; E) and
Formally, an increase in ! (V ) holding …xed V can change the sign of ! (V ) (G 0 ) from negative to positive and induce borrowing.
Applications

Network structure and welfare
We now turn to explore how the network structure a¤ects the payo¤s from borrowing in the social collateral model. Since the network is completely summarized by the vector of capacities c, the borrowing limit T st (c) can be viewed as a "trust map"that determines, as a function of the network structure c, how much trust is created between s and t. To see how trust determines payo¤s, let st (c) denote the expected payo¤ of s from borrowing, conditional on the lender being agent t;
because the payo¤ is just the expectation of !(V ) over all values of V that do not exceed the borrowing limit T st (c). Changes in the network a¤ect the payo¤s through changes in the trust ‡ow T st (c). Our goal in this section is to characterize these welfare e¤ects. 15
Monotonicity. We …rst explore the e¤ect of increasing connectivity by adding new links or strengthening existing links. We say that the network associated with capacity c 1 is more strongly connected than that associated with c 2 if no link has lower capacity under c 1 than under c 2 ; that is, c 1 (u; v) c 2 (u; v) for all u; v 2 W . We then have the following monotonicity result.
Proposition 1 If the social network with capacity c 1 is more strongly connected than the network with capacity c 2 , then for any borrower s and lender t; both trust and payo¤ s are higher: T st (c 1 )
Networks with more and stronger links generate more trust and higher payo¤s due to the increased supply in social collateral. A large body of work in sociology relies on the result formalized here: Putnam's (1995) , for example, argues that "networks of civic engagement (...) encourage the emergence of social trust." The fact that this monotonicity emerges naturally in the social collateral model makes it a useful candidate for exploring other questions related to network-based trust.
Closure and structural holes. We now turn to study how the deeper structure of the network a¤ects payo¤s, focusing on changes in network closure, a concept often discussed in the sociology literature. Networks have high closure if the neighborhoods of connected agents have a large overlap. To illustrate, consider the two network neighborhoods of agent s in Figure 5 , which is a small variation of Figure 1 in Coleman (1988) . The neighborhood of s in Figure 5B has higher closure, because the friends of s are directly connected. This idea of closure can also be formulated using network paths: a neighborhood has high closure if it connects s to few others through many paths (as in Figure 5B ), while it has low closure if it connects s to many others through fewer paths each ( Figure 5A ).
The sociology literature has two views about the bene…ts of closure. One view, dating back to Coleman (1988) , argues that high closure is good because it facilitates sanctions, making it easier for individuals to trust each other. In his discussion of the wholesale diamond market in New York City, Coleman explains that "If any member of this community defected through substituting other stones or stealing stones in his temporary possession, he would lose family, religious and community ties." Similarly, in the context of Figure 5 , Coleman argues that in the high closure network of Figure 5B , agents t 1 and t 2 can "combine to provide a collective sanction, or either can reward the other for sanctioning."
In contrast, Granovetter (1973) and Burt (1995) argue that "loose" networks with low closure lead to higher performance, because they allow agents to reach many others through the network.
Burt also emphasizes the role of "structural holes," that is, people who bridge otherwise disconnected networks: e.g., s is a structural hole in Figure 5A , but not in 5B. According to Burt (2000) , these structural holes "broker the ‡ow of information between people, and control the projects that bring together people from opposite sides of the hole." A key part of this argument is that low closure networks provide easier access to small favors, advice, information and other resources.
To explore these issues in the social collateral model, we …rst develop a measure of network closure, building on the idea that high closure is associated with having multiple paths to a smaller set of agents. We begin with counting the total number of paths of an agent, using the concept of network ‡ows. Fix a network with integer-valued capacities c; then the network ‡ow T st (c) is e¤ectively the number of disjoint paths of unit capacity between s and t. Thus, the total path number for s is simply T s (c) = P t2W T st (c). In Figure 5 , s has a total of four paths in both networks; the di¤erence in closure comes from the fact that in 5A, these four paths reach four di¤erent people, while in 5B they reach only two people, but there are two paths connecting s with either of them. 16 To generalize this observation, let P s (n) denote the share of paths s has with agents to whom he has at least n paths, so that P s (2) = 0 in Figure 5A and P s (2) = 1 in Figure 5B . 17 Clearly, P s (0) = 1 always, and P s (n) is non-increasing in n.
De…nition 5 The network neighborhood of s has a higher closure than the neighborhood of s 0 if (i) T s (c) = T s 0 (c) so that s and s 0 have the same total number of paths; and (ii) For each n, P s (n) P s 0 (n), so that a greater share of paths connect s to people with whom he has many paths.
These conditions imply that if the neighborhood of s has higher closure, then s is connected to fewer people through many paths. 18 This de…nition allows us to compare high and low closure neighborhoods. The key theoretical insight is that higher closure increases trust but reduces access. For example, in Figure 5B two people trust s with assets of value V 2; while access is low, trust is high in this closed network.
In contrast, in Figure 5A , s can borrow from four people, but the asset value can be at most 1:
access has increased, but at the cost of a reduction in pairwise trust. Due to this trade-o¤, whether high or low closure is associated with greater welfare depends on what assets are exchanged: trust is more important for high-value assets while access matters more for low-value assets.
To formalize this trade-o¤ between access and pairwise trust, we let f (v) denote the density of F (v), and let e !(V ) = f (V )! (V ), the frequency-weighted pro…ts from the ability to borrow V . Note that e !(V ) depends on both the probability that an asset of value V is needed (f (V )), and on the pro…ts this asset generates (! (V )). We say that the economy is a high value exchange environment if e !(V ) is increasing: in this case high value transactions generate greater welfare e !(V ), either because they are more likely, or because they are more productive. Conversely, we say we are in a low value exchange environment when e !(V ) is decreasing.
Proposition 2 In a high value exchange environment, a neighborhood with higher closure leads to a higher expected payo¤ to s. Conversely, in a low value exchange environment, a neighborhood with higher closure leads to a lower expected payo¤ to s.
In a low value exchange environment, the access provided by low closure is more attractive, because knowing more people directly or indirectly increases the likelihood that s can obtain a lowvalue asset. This logic is in line with Granovetter's and Burt's basic argument about the strength of weak ties and the bene…ts of a dispersed social network in providing access to assets with low moral hazard, such as small favors, information or advice. 19 In contrast, in a high value exchange environment, closure is better. Here, a reduction in access is more than compensated for by the fact that, through his dense connections, s will be able to borrow even high-valued assets. This …nding parallels Coleman's general argument for network closure, and particularly his example of the wholesale diamond market in New York City, where the exchange of valuable stones requires high trust between dealers. 20 The results of the Proposition are related to Putnam's (2000) concepts of bridging and bonding social capital. In Putnam's view, bonding social capital is associated with dense social networks 1 8 Also note that (ii) is equivalent to requiring that the cumulative distribution function 1 P s (:) …rst order stochastically dominates 1 P s 0 (:). 1 9 Section 3.2 develops a variant of our basic setup where exchange of information is explicitly modelled. 2 0 Vega-Redondo (2005) reports a related …nding in a model of repeated games played in networks. He shows that stability of cooperative behavior depends on a certain measure of network cohesiveness. and is good for generating reciprocity between agents who know each other well. In contrast, the networks underlying bridging social capital are "outward looking and encompass people across diverse social cleavages,"and are good for "linkage to external assets and for information di¤usion."
These two concepts parallel our distinction between trust and access; our results thus provide formal foundations as well as network-based measures for bonding and bridging social capital.
Community size and network closure. What determines network closure? In Allcott, Karlan, Mobius, Rosenblat, and Szeidl (2007) , we argue that in practice, community size should be an important determinant. The intuition is straightforward: in a small community, the pool of potential friends is limited, which makes it more likely that two agents share common friends. In Allcott et al. (2007) , we con…rm this intuition using data on the social networks of students in the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (AddHealth). 21 Normalizing all link capacities to unity, we build on De…nition 5 to measure the closure of the network around a student s with P s (2), the share of all paths that s has that connect him with others with whom he/she is connected through at least two paths. 22 This quantity is always between zero and one, and higher values represent more closed networks. Figure 6 compares this measure of closure for schools below and above the median size, for each possible value of a student's number of friends. This …gure con…rms that community size is an important predictor of closure in practice: even holding …xed a student's number of friends, smaller communities exhibit higher network closure.
Implications for organizations. The connection between community size and closure, combined with Proposition 2, has implications for organizational design. In environments where access to small favors like providing information is important, communities should be larger. This can be achieved through a ‡at organizational structure where rank does not limit interactions. For example, academic communities in the U.S. have a relatively informal culture, generating a large community of researchers; this encourages the development of weak ties and creates access to ideas.
In contrast, organizations where trust is important can create it by having smaller communities.
For instance, the hierarchical structure of armies limits interactions to peers of the same rank, creating networks with high closure and bonding social capital.
Our results also help explain the empirical fact that community size is often negatively correlated with prosocial behaviors such as volunteering, work on public projects, and helping friends (Putnam 2000) . The traditional explanation is that in large communities people have fewer friends (Jacobs 1993 ). Our results suggest that even controlling for the number of friends, large communities have less dense social networks, which limits the provision of valuable public goods.
Job search and trust in recommendations
Sociologists have long recognized the importance of networks for …nding jobs. For example, in "Getting a Job," Granovetter (1974) documents that 56% of his sample of white-collar workers found employment through personal contacts. One possible explanation is that information about job openings often travels through friends and acquaintances. This logic forms the basis of Granovetter's (1973) "strength of weak ties"theory, formally modeled by Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) , which predicts that weak links to agents with whom one has few common friends are most useful for job search, because they provide access to otherwise unobtainable information. However, the evidence about the strength of weak ties is mixed. Studies in U.S. cities (Bridges and Villemez 1986, Marsden and Hurlbert 1988) …nd that both weak and strong ties are important for job search. In Japan, Watanabe (1987) documents that small business employers screen applicants using strong ties. In China, Bian (1997 Bian ( , 1999 argues that the guanxi system of personal relationships allocates jobs using strong ties and paths. Granovetter (1974) provides a second reason for the importance of connections: networks can generate trust in job recommendations. When there is asymmetric information about the skills of job candidates, o¤ers are often made based on the opinions of trusted recommenders. In Granovetter's sample, such trusted referrals are common: in 60% of all jobs obtained through a network path of length 2 or more, the worker's direct contact had "put in a good word" for him. Since trusted referrals are more likely to come through strong ties, this logic can help explain why many empirical studies have found strong ties to be more important.
We now turn to explore the implications of network-based trust for job search using the social collateral model. 23 Consider an employer t who needs to …ll a vacancy. Potential employees are either high or low types; if hired, a high type generates total value S H and a low type generates S L , where S H > S L > 0. In the formal labor market, worker types are unobservable, the proportion of high types is H , and the prevailing market wage rate is w. Thus, hiring from the labor market generates an expected surplus S = H S H +(1 H ) S L , of which S w accumulates to the employer. However, the employer may be able to hire a known high type through his social network. If s is a high type job candidate, and his type can be credibly communicated to the employer, then the surplus from hiring s versus hiring from the formal labor market is S H S. Assuming that this surplus is divided by Nash bargaining where the bargaining weight of the worker is , the wage of s if hired is w H = w + S H S , and the excess pro…t of the …rm relative to hiring from the labor market is (1 ) S H S . These predictions are consistent with several empirical facts. The …rst prediction helps explain the mixed evidence about the strength of weak ties by showing that for many jobs strong ties should be more important; it also implies that the strength of weak ties should vary with the skill-intensity of the job, a prediction that awaits empirical testing. Consistent with the second prediction, Granovetter (1974) reports that in his sample, "jobs o¤ering the highest salary are much more prone to be found through contacts than others: whereas less than half of jobs yielding less than $10,000 per year were found by contacts, the …gure is more than three-quarters for those paying more than $25,000."This positive correlation between referrals and salary is also con…rmed by Simon and Warner (1992) and Gorcoran, Datcher, and Duncan (1980) . Regarding the intensity of network search, Brown (1967) …nds that among college professors, personal networks are more frequently used in obtaining jobs of higher rank, smaller teaching loads, higher salaries and at more prestigious colleges. For these attractive jobs, reducing asymmetric information is likely to be more important, and hence, employers have a stronger preference for searching through their networks.
Our predictions would not emerge in a model where the network serves purely as a source of information about job vacancies. In such an economy, the network does not reduce information asymmetries, hence the wage di¤erential is zero and the importance of network-based recommendations does not vary with the type of the job. Our results thus suggest that a full analysis of networks in labor markets should incorporate both information transmission and trust in recommendations.
Trust and asymmetric information. The social collateral model can also be used to study other situations involving asymmetric information. For example, a simple alteration of our job search framework shows that network-based recommendations can help identify whether a given borrower is intrinsically a trustworthy type. 25 A similar logic applies for transactions of valuable assets like houses, which involve a potential "lemons" problem: sellers with whom the buyer has a high trust ‡ow are more likely to be honest about the quality of the good, to avoid future retribution through social sanctions. 26 We conclude that the implications of social collateral in the presence of asymmetric information are similar to the basic model with moral hazard: higher trust ‡ow can secure transactions where there is greater exposure to asymmetric information.
Measuring social collateral in Peru
We now turn to empirically evaluate the social collateral model using a unique dataset of two low income Peruvian shantytown communities further described in . Two key features of the data make it particularly useful for our purposes:
(1) information on the social networks of individuals; (2) data on informal loans between friends, relatives and acquaintances.
Data description
In 2005, a survey was collected in two communities located in the Northern Cone of Lima. The heads of households and spouses (if available) of 299 households were interviewed. The survey consisted of two components: a household survey and a social network survey. The household survey recorded a list of all members of the household and basic demographic characteristics, including gender, education, occupation and income; summary statistics of these variables are reported in Table 2 .
Average monthly household income in the two communities was 957 and 840 Peruvian New Soles (S/.), respectively, which equals approximately 294 and 258 USD, using the exchange rate in 2005.
The social network component of the survey asked the household head and spouse to list up to 10 individuals in the community with whom the respondent spends the most time in an average week. We use this data to construct an undirected "OR"-network, where two agents have a link if one of them names the other. Agents have, on average, 8.6 links, and the average geographic distance between connected agents is 42 and 39 meters in the two communities; this is considerably lower than the geographic distance between two randomly selected addresses, which is 132 and 107 meters, respectively. 27 About 59 percent of relationships were classi…ed by respondents as "vecino"
(neighbor) and 39 percent as "amigo" or "compadre" (friend). The share of "relativos" was just 2 percent. 28 Vecinos live slightly closer than amigos/compadres (35 versus 51 meters). Over 90 percent of directly connected people met in the neighborhood for the …rst time.
Importantly for our purposes, the social network survey also recorded, for each responder, the set of friends from whom he or she had borrowed money during the past 12 months. There are 254 informal loans in the dataset; 167 borrowers in 138 households reported to have borrowed on average 76 S/. (about 23 USD) from 173 lenders during the past 12 months. Thus, informal borrowing is very common in these communities: 46 percent of all households have at least one household member who borrowed money in this manner. The mean age of both the borrower and the lender is 39 years and they live, on average, 36 meters apart.
Empirical framework
Measuring capacities and trust ‡ow. To adapt our model of social collateral to this empirical setting, we need to develop a measure of link capacity. We use the amount of time spent together as a proxy for the strength of a connection, capturing the intuition that link values depend on investment in joint social activity. In the data, the distribution of time spent together is skewed: the average responder spends fewer than 6 minutes with the bottom 10 percent of his/her friends and more than 3 hours with the top 10 percent. To obtain a more homogenous measure, we de…ne normalized time for two connected agents u and v as the value, for the amount of time they spend together, of the empirical cumulative distribution function of time spent together in their community. With this de…nition, the empirical distribution of normalized time (u; v) across all connected pairs is a discretized uniform distribution on the unit interval in each community.
We assume that link capacities are created by an increasing production function g such that c (u; v) = g ( (u; v)), i.e., spending more time together results in stronger links. We compute the network ‡ow between agents s and t by de…ning the circle of trust to be the subgraph that contains all links of s and t. This circle of trust allows for a simple decomposition of the trust ‡ow between s and t as
where the …rst term represents the direct ‡ow and the second term is the indirect ‡ow. Here N s is the set of direct friends of agent s.
Discrete choice framework. A natural approach to estimate the social collateral model is to
use observations on how much agents borrow, and to use the loan size as a lower bound for the trust ‡ow. This approach runs into the di¢ culty that loan amounts are also a¤ected by demand: a borrower might borrow less than the trust ‡ow. To avoid explicitly modeling loan demand, we instead base our estimation on who the agent borrows from, exploiting the idea that people are more likely to borrow from friends who trust them. By conditioning on the borrower, this approach e¤ectively controls for loan demand as a …xed e¤ect.
We formulate the borrower's choice of lender as a discrete choice problem. Consider agent s;
who is in need of a loan of size V , which he can borrow from potential lenders t 1 ,...,t k . We write the total utility that s enjoys when he borrows from a particular lender t as
where u is increasing and " t represents either measurement error in the trust between s and t, or a supply shock. Appendix C provides micro-foundations for this representation by assuming that if V exceeds the level of trust T st , the excess value must be secured using physical collateral which has some opportunity cost. Then, the borrower is more likely to turn to a lender who trusts him more, implying preferred lender = arg max
since, conditional on the loan amount, (7) is maximized when trust is highest. 
Results
Graphical analysis. We begin with a graphical analysis of trust ‡ow and borrowing to highlight the basic patterns in the data. Assume that the strength of a link is proportional to normalized time: (u; v) . Then trust ‡ow T st can be written as c st ; where st measures the total (direct plus indirect) "time ‡ow" between agents s and t, computed using equation (6). Figure 7 depicts the relationship between trust ‡ow and borrowing in our sample, conditioned on borrower-speci…c …xed e¤ects. The construction of the …gure is the following. We introduce an indicator variable I st ; which is one if we observe s borrowing from t. For each borrower s we calculate the mean time s she spends with her friends, and the share I s of friends she borrows from. We then de…ne the borrower's "excess time ‡ow" with lender t as st s , and her "excess borrowing"from t by I st I s . Figure 7 is simply a plot of excess borrowing against excess time ‡ow, where observations are averaged over intervals of excess time ‡ow to smooth out all uncorrelated noise. The …gure shows a strong positive relationship, con…rming the basic prediction that agents should be more likely to borrow from friends who trust them. Table 1 we group all friends of each borrower into four categories along two dimensions: whether the direct ‡ow between borrower and friend is below or above the average direct ‡ow, and whether the indirect ‡ow between borrower and friend is below or above the average indirect ‡ow. For each category we calculate the share of lenders the borrower ends up borrowing from. If both the direct and indirect ‡ow are below average, the borrower asks the lender with 10 percent probability for a loan. If either the direct or indirect ‡ow is above average, borrowing roughly doubles. If both the direct and indirect ‡ow are above average, borrowing triples.
Indirect paths appear to play an important role in creating social collateral for borrowing.
Structural estimation. To analyze the relationship between trust ‡ow and borrowing in greater detail, we now estimate the discrete choice model (8). This allows us to measure the relative strength of di¤erent network links, as well as to formally test our predictions. We allow capacities to depend on the time spent together in a ‡exible way, by classifying every link as weak, medium or strong, depending on whether the time spent together lies in the lowest, medium, or top third of the time distribution for each of the two communities. Each direct and indirect path between borrower and lender then makes a weak, medium or strong contribution to total ‡ow, where the strength of these di¤erent link types is measured by unknown parameters c W , c M and c S . Given our de…nition of the circle of trust, the trust ‡ow T st (c) between s and t, as given by (6), is easily seen to be a linear function of c = (c W ; c M ; c S ). Assuming that the error term " has the extreme value distribution, we can then estimate (8) as a conditional logit
where > 0 measures the relative importance of the error term. Given the linearity of T st in c, the unobserved parameters and c cannot be separately identi…ed, but we can use the estimates to back out capacity ratios like c S =c M . Table 3 reports our logit estimates. The …rst column contains our baseline speci…cation; the coe¢ cient estimates on total weak, medium and strong ‡ow correspond to c W = , c M = and c S = in the estimating equation. The e¤ect of weak paths on borrowing is insigni…cant and small: gaining access to lenders through weak ties appears to be relatively less important for obtaining loans.
Both medium and strong paths have a highly signi…cant positive e¤ect on borrowing, and the e¤ect of strong paths is signi…cantly larger. One additional medium path to a lender increases the probability of borrowing by a factor of 1:44, while an additional strong path increases the probability by a factor of 2:7. The ratio of the point estimates implies that the capacity of strong links is about three times as high as that of medium links: c S =c M 2:7. These results support prediction 1, that trust ‡ow should be positively related to borrowing, and highlight the importance of strong ties.
Is the contribution of an indirect path di¤erent from that of a direct path? To compare indirect and direct paths, in column 2 we add the number of indirect medium and strong paths as separate controls in the regression. According to our second prediction, the coe¢ cients of these variables should be zero. We …nd that the estimated coe¢ cients on indirect ‡ow are negative, but not statistically signi…cant, and smaller than the corresponding coe¢ cients on total ‡ow. These results show that both direct and indirect paths have a substantial positive e¤ect on borrowing, con…rming the basic intuition that dense networks are better in creating social collateral. The negative estimates on indirect ‡ows, while insigni…cant, suggest that the e¤ect of indirect paths is slightly smaller, which can be explained in our model by endogenizing the circle of trust as in Section 2.6. Combined
with the results about strong ties, these estimates suggest that dense networks and bonding social capital are important for obtaining loans in these communities.
We now test the prediction about the role of the weakest link in column 3, where we include two new explanatory variables in the regression. "Weak-notweak ‡ow" counts the number of indirect paths where one link is weak and the other is medium or strong; while "medium-strong ‡ow"counts the number of paths where one link is medium and the other is strong. If prediction 3 is false, then these paths should have a positive e¤ect on borrowing beyond what is predicted by the social collateral "weakest link"theory. The estimated coe¢ cients on these variables are insigni…cant and small, providing strong evidence for the role of the weakest link in determining social collateral.
These results are replicated in column 4 which includes the controls for indirect ‡ows.
Our …ndings about the role of indirect paths and the weakest link property help distinguish our model from other explanations for borrowing, such as altruism and information transmission.
One caveat with our econometric analysis is that if time spent together increases due to borrowing, reverse causality confounds the interpretation of the estimates. Thus, the evidence supports, albeit not exclusively, the social collateral model; moreover, strong ties and network closure, i.e., bonding social capital, appear to be particularly important for borrowing. Importantly, the theoretical framework provides clear predictions that can be tested in further settings, with perhaps more control over key empirical identi…cation issues.
Conclusion
This paper built a model where agents use their social connections as collateral to secure informal loans. This model naturally led to a de…nition of network-based trust, which we then used in applications related to network structure and welfare, trust in job search, and the measurement of social capital. We conclude by sketching three other applications of the social collateral model.
Network statistics. When informal arrangements are restricted by the circle of trust to connec-tions within a given social distance, our model generates a family of trust measures. Our working paper, , shows that when all links have equal capacity, these measures are functions of several commonly used network statistics, including 1) number of friends; 2) the clustering coe¢ cient, which is a measure of local network density; 3) the number of common friends of two agents; and 4) the number of transitive triples, another measure of network density. 30 These results provide social collateral-based foundations for common network statistics.
Risk-sharing. Development economists often emphasize the importance of informal insurance in developing countries. Ambrus, Mobius, and Szeidl (2008) use the social collateral model to explore risk-sharing in networks. They …nd that good risk-sharing requires networks to be expansive: larger sets of agents should have more connections with the rest of the community. Networks shaped by geographic proximity have this property, because agents tend to have friends at close distance in multiple directions, helping to explain the observed good risk-sharing in village environments. They also …nd that network-based insurance is local: socially closer agents insure each other more.
Dynamics of trust and panics. In the basic social collateral model, link capacities are exogenous. Mobius and Szeidl (2008) show that link values can be endogenized with multiple rounds of exchange. The strength of a relationship is, then, the sum of its direct value, as in the basic model, plus the indirect value, which derives from the ability to conduct transactions through the link in the future. In this framework, ‡uctuations can be ampli…ed through a network multiplier similar to the social multiplier of Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (2003) , because trust withdrawal that constrains exchange locally can lead to further trust withdrawals that ripple through the network. A weak ‡ow of origin s can be thought of as taking a certain amount from node s and carrying it to various other nodes in the network. By weak ‡ow conservation, any node other than s receives a non-negative amount.
Lemma 1 We can decompose any weak ‡ow g as
where for each u, f u is an s ! u ‡ow; i.e., P w f u (v; w) = 0 for all v 6 = u, v 6 = s, and moreover P w f u (u; w) = P w g(u; w) i.e., f u delivers the same amount to u that g does.
Proof. Consider vertex u such that P w g(u; w) < 0. By weak ‡ow conservation, the amount of the ‡ow that is left at u must be coming from s. Hence, there must be a ‡ow f u g carrying this amount from s. With f u de…ned in such a way, repeat the same procedure for the weak ‡ow g f u with some other vertex u 0 . After de…ning f u for all vertices u, the remainder f 0 satis…es ‡ow conservation everywhere and can be added to any of the ‡ows. Implicit summation notation: For a weak ‡ow g and two vertex sets U W and V W , we use the notation that
Proof of Theorem 1
Su¢ ciency. We begin by showing that when (4) holds, a side-deal proof equilibrium exists. By assumption, there exists an s ! t ‡ow with value V . For all u and v, let h (u; v) equal the value assigned by this ‡ow to the (u; v) link. Now consider the strategy pro…le where (1) the borrowing arrangement h is proposed and accepted; (2) the borrower returns the asset; (3) all transfers are paid if the borrower fails to return the asset. This strategy is clearly an equilibrium. To verify that it is side-deal proof, consider any side-deal, and let S denote the set of agents involved. For s to be strictly better o¤, it must be that he prefers not returning the asset in the side-deal. Now consider the (S; T ) cut. By de…nition, the amount that ‡ows through this cut under the original arrangement is V ; but then the same amount must ‡ow through the cut in the side-deal, as well. This means that s must transfer at least V in the side-deal, but then he cannot be better o¤. More generally, this argument shows that any transfer arrangement that satis…es ‡ow conservation is side-deal proof.
Necessity. We now show that when (4) is violated, no side-deal proof equilibrium exists. We proceed by assuming to the contrary that a pure strategy side-deal proof equilibrium implements borrowing even though (4) fails. First note that on the equilibrium path, the borrower must weakly prefer not to default. To see why, suppose that the borrower chooses to default on the equilibrium path. Since the lender and all intermediate agents must at least break even, this implies that the borrower has to make a transfer payment of at least V . But then the borrower must weakly prefer not to default, since returning the asset directly has a cost of V . This also implies that all intermediate agents must have a zero payo¤.
By assumption, there exists an (S; T ) cut with value c (S; T ) < V . We now construct a side-deal where all intermediate agents in S continue to get zero, but the payo¤ of s strictly increases. The idea is easiest to understand in an equilibrium where promises are kept, i.e., when all transfers satisfy the capacity constraint h (u; v) c (u; v). Then, we simply construct an arrangement that satis…es ‡ow conservation inside S, and delivers to the "boundary"of S the exact amount that was promised to be carried over to T under h. More generally, when the capacity constraints fail over some links, the deviation in the side-deal can result in some agents in S losing friendships with agents outside S. To compensate for this loss, the side-deal must deliver to the "boundary" of S an additional amount that equals the lost friendship value.
Formally, let g be a maximal s ! t ‡ow and consider the restriction of g to S. This is a weak ‡ow, and by the lemma it can be decomposed as g = P u2S g u , where each g u is an s ! u ‡ow. Now for each u 2 S, let g (u; T ) and h (u; T ) denote the amounts leaving S through u under g and h. Moreover, for each u 2 S, let z (u; T ) denote the total friendship value lost to u in the subgame where the borrower defaults, as a consequence of unkept transfer promises. Since g is a maximum ‡ow and (S; T ) is a minimal cut, it follows that g (u; T ) h (u; T ) + z (u; T ). This is because any link between u and T is either represented in h (u; T ), if u pays the transfer, or z (u; T ), if u does not pay and loses the friendship. This inequality implies that, whenever h (u; T ) + z (u; T ) > 0, we also have g (u; T ) > 0. As a result, we can de…ne
Note that h 0 is a weak ‡ow in S, and delivers exactly h (u; T ) + z (u; T ) to all agents in S. Thus h 0 satis…es ‡ow conservation within S and delivers to the "boundary" of S the sum of two terms: h (u; T ), which is the precise amount to be carried over to T under h, and z (u; T ) which is the loss of friendship u su¤ers due to not making other promised transfers. We claim that h 0 is a pro…table side-deal. First, h 0 satis…es all capacity constraints by construction. Second, all agents in S break even under h 0 , as they did in the original equilibrium. Third, the total value delivered by h is at most c (S; T ) < V , which means that s pays less than V under h 0 , while he pays exactly V in the original equilibrium. We have constructed a side-deal in which the borrower is better o¤ and all other players are best-responding; hence, the original equilibrium was not side-deal proof.
Proof for Section 2.6
Transfer constraints. In this analysis, we use a more stringent equilibrium selection criterion: We look for equilibria where (i) all promised transfers are paid; and (ii) there are no pro…table side-deals. In the earlier analysis, there was no need to impose (i), because the characterization results showed that any level of borrowing that can be implemented can also be implemented using equilibria where all transfers are paid. With transfer constraints, requiring that all promises are credible has additional bite, because promises that are not credible can generate large punishment in the form of loss of friendship to agents who have small k u . We …nd it plausible that such agents will not make promises that they know they cannot keep, but instead of providing formal microfoundations for this, we simply restrict ourselves to equilibria that are "credible,"in the sense that all promises are kept.
Consider the directed network G 0 de…ned in the text and let the maximum s 1 ! t 1 ‡ow in G 0 be denoted by T s 1 t 1 (c).
Proposition 4 There exists a side-deal proof equilibrium with credible promises that implements borrowing if and only if
Proof. Su¢ ciency. If (10) holds, then take a ‡ow with value V , and let the ‡ow values between di¤erent agents de…ne the transfer arrangement in our candidate equilibrium. Note that by construction, this borrowing arrangement satis…es the borrowing constraints of all agents u. Moreover, the promised transfers in this arrangement will be kept because they all satisfy the capacity constraint. It remains to be shown that there are no pro…table side-deals; this follows from the same argument used in the proof of Theorem 1.
Necessity. Suppose that (10) fails, and consider an equilibrium where promised transfers are paid and borrowing is implemented. We now show that this equilibrium admits a side-deal. Our argument is similar to the proof of Theorem 1, in that we build the side-deal using a minimum cut on the network G 0 . However, the present setup has one additional di¢ culty: we need to make sure that the side-deal emerging from the minimum cut does not separate agents from their duplicates.
Let (S 0 ; T 0 ) be a minimum cut. If for some u 6 = s we have u 2 2 S 0 , then u 1 2 S 0 also holds, because u 2 has only one incoming link, which originates in u 1 . Let S be the union of s and the collection of agents u such that u 1 2 S 0 . We need to show that agents in S; as a group, do not have the right incentive to return the asset. To see why, consider …rst an agent u 2 S such that u 2 = 2 S 0 . It follows that the (S 0 ; T 0 ) cut separated u 1 from u 2 , by cutting the u 1 ! u 2 link. But in this equilibrium, promises are kept, and, hence, the total obligation of u to agents outside S can be at most k u , which is exactly the value of the cut link. Next consider an agent u 2 S such that u 2 2 S'. For this agent, the total obligations to others outside S are bounded from above by the total value of the links originating in u 2 that are cut. Summing over all u 2 S, we conclude that the total obligation of all agents in S do not exceed the value of the (S 0 ; T 0 ) cut, and, hence, is strictly smaller than V . Thus, S; as a group, has an incentive to default. The actual side-deal can now be constructed in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider two capacities c 1 c 2 . Any ‡ow between s and t that is feasible under c 1 is also feasible under c 2 ; hence the maximum ‡ow cannot be lower under c 2 than under c 1 :
Proof of Proposition 2
We denote the share of total paths to agents with whom agent s has precisely j paths with q s (j). If we treat this function as a probability density function over the non-negative integers, then an increase in closure is equivalent to a …rst-order stochastic dominance shift.
The expected payo¤ of s; conditional on him being the borrower, can be written as
which can be viewed as the expected value of the function (j)=j under the probability density q s (j). In a high value value exchange environment, (V ) is convex because (V ) 0 = e !(V ) is increasing; this, combined with the fact that (0) = 0 implies that (V )=V is nondecreasing. In this case, a …rst-order stochastic dominance increase in the probability density q s (j) increases the expected payo¤ by de…nition. An analogous argument shows that in a low value exchange environment, the same increase in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance reduces the expected payo¤ of s.
Proof of Proposition 3
Preliminaries. The timeline of the model with job search is the following. In stage 1, a set of agents, including s 1 :::; s k and t; agree on a transfer arrangement that speci…es transfers h (u; v) to be made in the event that s 1 :::; s k send recommendations, s is hired and then turns out to be a low type. In stage 2, agents s 1 :::; s k choose whether to recommend s to the employer t. In stage 3, t decides whether to hire s or not; pro…ts are earned, and the type of s is publicly revealed. In stage 4, if needed, the transfer arrangement is executed; and in stage 5, agents consume the values of remaining links.
We consider a class of coalitional deviations that we call side-deals with bribes. A side-deal with bribes is a new transfer arrangement proposed by s to s 1 ; :::; s k and potentially some other agents at the beginning of stage 2, together with a set of bribes b 1 ,...,b k that s pays to s 1 ,...,s k in exchange for their recommendation. For simplicity, we assume that bribes are spot transactions: each agent s j sends the recommendation at the same time that he receives the bribe.
We assume that when the surpluses from hiring through the network and in the market are the same, t always hires in the market.
Proof of Proposition 3. Fix a pure strategy equilibrium robust to side-deals with bribes. If a low type is hired in this equilibrium, then the expected surplus from the employment relationship is S, which is the same as hiring in the formal market, and hence t never hires through the network. It follows that in equilibrium only high types are hired in the network. Now suppose that in this equilibrium e T st (c) < S H S and the high type worker is hired. Then the low type can propose a pro…table side-deal with bribes. As in the proof of the main theorem, this side-deal includes all agents in a minimum cut separating s from t in G 1 , and transmits an amount equal to the maximum ‡ow to agents at the boundary of the cut. The bribes in the side-deal are speci…ed to equal the amounts that ‡ow through agents s 1 ,...,s k in this ‡ow. It follows that all agents weakly prefer accepting this side-deal: intermediate agents at least break even by ‡ow conservation; and the friends of s all break even because the bribes exactly compensate them for the payments to be made in the side-deal. This contradiction shows that in any side-deal proof equilibrium where the high type is hired, we must have e T st (c) S H S . Finally, if this inequality holds, then the transfer arrangement speci…ed by the maximum ‡ow in G 1 is easily seen to be an equilibrium robust to side-deals with bribes.
Appendix B: Microfoundations for social sanctions
In this section, we develop a model where punishment at the level of the link arises endogenously. There are three key changes relative to the model presented in the main text: (1) with probability p > 0, the asset disappears, e.g., is stolen by a third party, after the borrower uses it. (2) Each link "goes bad" with a small probability " during the model, capturing the idea that friendships can disappear for exogenous reasons. (3) The utility of friendship is modelled using a "friendship game" where agents can choose to interact or stay away from each other. The payo¤s of this friendship game depend on the capacity of the link and on whether the link has gone bad.
Model setup. This model consists of the following six stages: Stage 1: Realization of needs. Identical to stage 1 in Section 2. Stage 2: Borrowing arrangement. In this model, there is uncertainty about whether the asset disappears after being used. As a result, the arrangement is now a set of state contingent payments, where the publicly observable state of the world i is either i = 0, if the asset is returned, or i = 1 if the asset is reported stolen. A borrowing agreement consists of two parts. 1) A contract specifying payments y i to be made by the borrower to the lender in the two states (i = 0 or 1). This contract can be thought of as a traditional incentive contract to solve the moral hazard problem in lending. If there was a perfect court system in the economy, then this contract would be su¢ cient to achieve e¢ cient lending. 2) A transfer arrangement specifying payments h i (u; v) to be made between agents in the social network if the borrower fails to make the payment y i . Here h i (u; v) denotes a payment to be made by u to v in state i. 32 Stage 3: Repayment. If an arrangement was reached in stage 2, the asset is borrowed and s earns an income of ! (V ), where !(:) is a di¤erentiable, non-decreasing function. Following the use of the asset, with probability p it is stolen. We assume that ! (V ) > pV for all V in the support of F , which guarantees that lending the asset is the socially e¢ cient allocation. Even if the asset is not stolen, the borrower may choose to pretend that it is stolen, and sell it at the liquidation value of V where < 1. The borrower then chooses whether to make the payment y i speci…ed in the contract.
Stage 4: Bad links. At this stage, any link in the network may "go bad" with some small probability. We think of bad links as the realization by a player that he no longer requires the business or friendship services of his friend. As we describe below, cooperation over bad links in the friendship game is no longer bene…cial. Therefore, agents who learn that a link has gone bad will …nd it optimal not to make a promised transfer along the link. From a technical perspective, bad links are a tool to generate cooperation without repeated play, just like the "Machiavellian types" in Dixit (2003) (see also Benoit and Krishna (1985) ). In an equilibrium where promised transfers are expected to be paid, failure by u to make a payment will be interpreted by v as evidence that the link has gone bad. In this case, v will defect in the friendship phase, which reduces the payo¤ of the deviator u by c (u; v).
To formalize bad links, assume that for every link of every agent, with a small probability " > 0 independent across agents and links, the player learns that his link has gone bad at this stage. Thus, for any link (u; v), the probability that the link has not gone bad is (1 ") 2 ; and for any link (u; v) where u does not learn that the link has gone bad, u still believes, correctly, that with probability " the link has gone bad.
Stage 5: Transfer payments. If the borrower chose to make payment y i in stage 3, then this stage of the game is skipped, and play moves on to the friendship phase. If the borrower did not make payment y i , then at this stage agents in the social network choose whether to make the prescribed transfers h i (u; v). Each agent has a binary choice: either he makes the promised payment in full or he pays nothing.
Stage 6: Friendship game. Each link between two agents u and v has a friendship game with an associated value c(u; v). As long as the link is good, the friendship game is a two-player coordination game with two actions, with payo¤s as depicted below.
This game has a unique equilibrium (C,C) with payo¤ c (u; v) to both parties, which represents the bene…t from friendly interactions. A party only derives positive bene…ts if his friend chooses to cooperate; and bene…ts are highest when there is mutual cooperation. If a link has gone bad, cooperation is no longer bene…cial, and the payo¤s of the friendship game change, as follows.
Here, mutual cooperation leads to the low payo¤ of 1, capturing the idea that parties who are no longer friends might …nd it unpleasant to interact. If either party defects, the payo¤ of both parties is set to zero. The payo¤s in the friendship game imply that if a player knows that a link has gone bad with probability 1, a best response is to play D.
Model analysis. Because there is uncertainty in this model, we need to extend the concept of side-deals to Bayesian games.
De…nition 7 Consider a pure strategy pro…le and a set of beliefs . A side-deal with respect to ( ; ) is a set of agents S, a transfer arrangement e h i (u; v) for all u; v 2 S, and a set of continuation strategies and beliefs f(e u ; e u ) ju 2 Sg proposed by s to agents at the end of stage 2, such that (i) U u (e u ; e S u ; S j e u ) U u ( 0 u ; e S u ; S j e u ) for all 0 u and all u 2 S, (ii) The beliefs e satisfy Bayes rule whenever possible if play is determined by (e S ; S ), (iii) U u (e S ; S j e u ) U u ( S ; S j ) for all u 2 S, (iv) U s (e S ; S j e u ) > U s ( S ; S j ).
The only conceptually new condition is (ii), which is clearly needed in a Bayesian environment. Motivated by this de…nition, our equilibrium concept will be a side-deal proof perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Theorem 2 There exists a side-deal proof perfect Bayesian equilibrium that implements borrowing between s and t if and only if the asset value V satis…es
Proof. We begin by analyzing the optimal incentive contract in the absence of enforcement constraints. Suppose that s makes payments x i (i = 0 or i = 1) in the two states of the world. What values of x i guarantee that s chooses to return the asset while t breaks even? To prevent s from stealing, the excess payment if the asset is reported stolen must exceed the liquidation value V :
In order for the lender to break even, he has to receive at least pV in expectation:
The minimum transfers which satisfy (12) and (13) are
Bringing back the enforcement constraints, it is intuitive that borrowing can be implemented in the network as long as max [x 0 ; x 1 ] does not exceed the maximum ‡ow between s and t: in that case, the lender can just transfer x i to the borrower along the network. Since x 1 > x 0 , this requires that x 1 does not exceed the maximum ‡ow, or equivalently
which is indeed the condition in the theorem. We now turn to the proof. Su¢ ciency. We begin by showing that when (11) holds, a side-deal proof equilibrium exists. Let x i be de…ned by (14) and let y i = x i . By assumption, there exists a ‡ow with respect to the capacity c that carries x 1 = (1 ") 2 from s to t. For all u and v, de…ne h 1 (u; v) to be 1 " times the value assigned by this ‡ow to the (u; v) link. Similarly, let h 0 (u; v) be equal to 1 " times a ‡ow that carries x 0 = (1 ") 2 from s to t. Now consider the strategy pro…le in which (1) the transfer arrangement (x i ; h i ) is proposed and accepted, (2) the asset is borrowed and returned unless stolen, (3) every agent u pays every promised transfer h i (u; v) if necessary, unless he learns that his link with v has gone bad, (4) all agents play C in the friendship game unless they learn that the link has gone bad, in which case they play D. This strategy pro…le generates beliefs , and ( ; ) constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. To see why, note that conditional on others making the transfer payments, it is optimal for s to make the payments y i and not to steal the asset. Also, since h i (u; v) (1 ") c (u; v), all agents …nd it optimal to make the transfer payments given beliefs. Finally, because on path play never gets to the transfers, all intermediate agents are indi¤erent between accepting the deal and rejecting it. In fact, even if the transfers were used in one or both states on path, intermediate agents would still break even, because h i are de…ned using ‡ows.
We also need to verify that the equilibrium proposed here is side-deal proof. Consider any sidedeal, and let S denote the set of agents involved. Suppose that after the side-deal, the borrower reports that the asset is stolen with probability p 0 p. Let T be the complement of S in W , and consider the (S; T ) cut. By de…nition, the expected amount that ‡ows through the (S; T ) cut in state i if y i is not paid equals x i . If the borrower never chooses to pay y i in the side-deal, he will have to make sure that at least p 0 x 1 + (1 p 0 ) x 0 gets to the cut in expectation. Because all intermediate agents must break even in expectation, this implies that s's expected payments must be p 0 x 1 + (1 p 0 ) x 0 or more. Thus the side-deal comes with a cost increase of (p 0 p) [x 1 x 0 ]. The increase in expected cost is easily seen to be the same if the borrower chooses to pay y i in one or both states. The expected bene…t of the side-deal is (p 0 p) V . By equation (12) the expected bene…t does not exceed the expected cost; the side-deal is not pro…table to s, which is a contradiction. Hence the original arrangement was side-deal proof.
Necessity. We now show that when (11) is violated, no side-deal proof equilibrium exists. We proceed by assuming to the contrary that a pure strategy side-deal proof perfect Bayesian equilibrium implements borrowing even though (11) fails. For simplicity, we assume that the equilibrium proposed transfers h i (u; v) are expected to be paid by all agents u in stage 5 if the borrower chooses not to pay y i directly; i.e., we only focus on equilibria where promises are kept. This condition is not necessary to obtain the result, but simpli…es the proof somewhat. If this condition holds, then h i (u; v)
(1 ") c (u; v) holds for all transfers proposed in equilibrium, because the amount that u can expect to bene…t from his friendship with v is at most (1 ") c (u; v).
Let i = 1 if in state i on the equilibrium path, s chooses not to pay y i , and let i = 0 otherwise.
In this case, on the equilibrium path, y i are never paid, and instead the transfer arrangements are always used. De…ne the expected transfer h = ph 1 + (1 p)h 0 . By the individual rationality of intermediate agents, h satis…es weak ‡ow conservation, and therefore by the Lemma can be decomposed as h = X u2V; u6 =t
where f u is s ! u ‡ow and h 0 = f t . In words, the f u ‡ows deliver the expected pro…ts to the intermediate agents, while h 0 is an s ! t ‡ow that delivers the expected payo¤ to the lender. Denote P u6 =t f u = f , then f is a weak ‡ow delivering the payments to all intermediate agents. Our proof strategy will be the following. First, we take out the pro…ts of all intermediate agents from the capacity c and the transfer h, essentially creating a "reduced"problem where intermediate agents are expected to break even. Then we construct a side-deal for this simpler case using the maximum ‡ow minimum cut theorem, and …nally transform this into a side-deal of the original setup.
Let c 0 (u; v) = c (u; v) f (u; v) = (1 ") be a capacity on G. Note that any ‡ow g 0 under c 0 can be transformed into a ‡ow g = g 0 + f = (1 ") that satis…es the capacity constraints c. Consider the functions h 0 i = h i f . It is easy to verify that h 0 i = (1 ") satisfy the capacity constraints with respect to c 0 , and that h 0 = ph 0 1 + (1 p) h 0 0 . Let (S; T ) be a minimal cut of the directed ‡ow network with capacity c 0 . By the maximum ‡ow-minimum cut theorem, there exists a maximum ‡ow g in the network that uses the full capacity of this cut. By assumption, the value of the cut under h 0 1 satis…es h 0 1 (S; T )= (1 ") g(S; T ) < x 1 = (1 ") 2 , which implies that
pV . In words, the value ‡owing through the minimal cut in the two states does not provide su¢ cient incentives to not steal the asset.
We now construct a side-deal for the reduced problem. The idea is to construct a transfer arrangement that satis…es ‡ow conservation inside S, and delivers to the "boundary" of S the exact amount that was promised to be carried over to T under h 0 . With such an arrangement, all agents in S will break even in each state, and thus the incentives that applied to S as a group will apply directly to agent s. Since S as a group did not have the right incentives, with the side-deal s will not have the right incentives either.
Formally, using the implicit summation notation, let for each u 2 S, g(u; T ), h 0 1 (u; T ) and h 0 0 (u; T ) denote the amounts leaving S through u via the maximum ‡ow g, h 0 1 , and h 0 0 . Clearly, (1 ") g(u; T ) h 0 1 (u; T ) and (1 ") g(u; T ) h 0 0 (u; T ). Now consider the restriction of g to the set S. This is a weak ‡ow, and by the lemma it can be decomposed as g = P u2S g u . De…ne h 00 1 = P u2S (h 0 1 (u; T )=g(u; T )) g u and h 00 0 = P u2S (h 0 0 (u; T )=g(u; T )) g u . Then h 00 1 and h 00 0 are both weak ‡ows in S, they satisfy h 00 i (1 ") c 0 , and deliver exactly h 0 1 (u) and h 0 0 (u) to all u 2 S. Thus h 00 i satis…es ‡ow conservation within S, and delivers to the "boundary" of S the amount promised to be carried over to T under h 0 1 , as desired. The total value delivered by h 00 i is the value of the cut links under h 0 i ; hence the amount that leaves s in the two states under h 00 satis…es (1 ") [jh 00 1 j jh 00 0 j] < x 1 x 0 , i.e., is insu¢ cient to provide incentives not to steal the asset. Now go back to the original network, and consider a side-deal with all agents in the set S, where these agents are promised a transfer arrangement f + h 00 i . This is just adding back the pro…ts of all agents to the side-deal of the reduced problem. With this de…nition, the new side-deal satis…es the capacity constraints f + h 00
(1 ") c 0 = (1 ") c f . Second, all agents in S will be indi¤erent, because they get the same expected pro…ts delivered by f (note that h 00 is a ‡ow in both states and thus nets to zero state by state). The agents who have links that are in the cut are indi¤erent because h 00 is de…ned such that its in ‡ow equals the required out ‡ow for these agents. Third, the side-deal does not have enough incentives for s not to steal the asset, because jh 00 1 j jh 00 0 j < V = (1 "). Moreover, if the original deal was bene…cial for s, then so is the new deal. This is because the cost of the original deal was jf j + jh 0 j. The cost of the new deal if the borrower follows the honest asset-return policy is jf j + jh 00 j. But both h 0 and h 00 are ‡ows, and they are equal on the (S; T ) cut, hence they have equal values. Therefore by following an honest policy, the borrower will have a cost equal to what he had to pay in the original deal. However, since the incentive compatibility constraint is not satis…ed, the borrower is strictly better o¤ always stealing the asset in the side deal. This argument shows that there exists a side-deal in which the borrower is strictly better o¤, and all other players are best-responding; hence the original equilibrium was not side-deal proof.
It remains to consider the cases where either 0 or 1 is equal to zero. In these cases, de…ne the expected transfer payments as h = p 1 h 1 + (1 p) 0 h 0 . As above, h is a weak ‡ow and thus f , the weak ‡ow delivering the expected pro…ts to all intermediate agents can be de…ned. Similarly, one can de…ne c 0 and h 0 i , and letting (S; T ) be the minimal cut of c 0 , h 0 1 (S; T )= (1 ") < x 1 = (1 ") 2 must hold. Case II: 0 = 1 and 1 = 0.
is a weak ‡ow, because it is a sum of two weak ‡ows. It follows that jh 0 j = jf j+jh 0 0 j jf j+jh 0 0 (S; T )j. Therefore jf j+jh 00 0 j jh 0 j because h 00 0 is a ‡ow and h 00 0 = h 0 0 on the (S; T ) cut. Moreover, incentive compatibility requires y 1 (1 ") jh 0 j V , while the break-even constraint of the lender means that py 1 + (1 p) (1 ") [jh 0 j jf j = (1 p)] pV . Combining these inequalities gives y 1 x 1 + (1 ") jf j. Now consider the side-deal h 00 i + f de…ned as above. Since jh 00 0 + f j jh 0 j y 0 = (1 ") and jh 00 1 + f j < x 1 = (1 ") + jf j y 1 = (1 "), the borrower will strictly prefer this arrangement to the previous one. Since all intermediate agents get net pro…ts delivered by f in both states in the side-deal, they are indi¤erent. Thus the proposed arrangement is indeed a side-deal.
Case III: 0 = 0 and 1 = 1.
Here h 1 is a weak ‡ow, which must deliver less than x 1 = (1 ") to t because by assumption x 1 = (1 ") is more than the maximum ‡ow. Thus incentive compatibility fails with the original agreement; even without any side-deal, the lender is better o¤ not returning the asset.
we can approximate this total utility as a linear function of T st (c)+" M " S . In this representation, the error term captures a combination of supply shocks and measurement error in trust. NOTE -This …gure illustrates the calculation of trust in simple networks. In all three panels, agent s wishes to borrow an asset from agent t. In panel A, both agents are direct friends and the borrowing limit is equal to 2, the strength of their relationship. In panel B their relationship is strengthened by a common friend u and the borrowing limit increases by min[3; 4] = 3, which is the value of the weakest link on the path connecting s and t through u. In panel C, borrower and lender are not direct friends and the borrowing limit is the sum of the weakest links on the two paths between s and t. See the text for details. Cousin NOTE -This …gure illustrates borrowing in networks with intermediaries. The arrangement favored in our paper involves transfers ‡owing from s through u to t in the event of default. In this arrangement the weakest link min[c(s; u); c(u; t)] determines the borrowing limit. An alternative arrangement, where cousin v promises to punish the borrower s in case of default, sometimes enforces better outcomes. However, this arrangement is not robust to "side-deals" by groups of agents: the borrower and his cousin can jointly deviate, steal the asset and short-change the lender. As we show in the text, all side-deal proof arrangements satisfy the "weakest link" requirement. NOTE -This …gure illustrates network ‡ow with transfer constraints. Agent s could normally borrow an asset up to value 4 from agent t. However, he faces a binding transfer constraint of 3:5. We can calculate network ‡ow in the constrained graph by drawing an auxiliary network where we split s into two agents s1 and s2. All incoming links of agent s are connected to s1 and all outgoing links emanate from agent s2. A directed link from s1 to s2 has capacity equal to the transfer constraint. The network ‡ow from s1 to agent t equals the maximum network ‡ow with transfer constraint. NOTE -This …gure shows network neighborhoods with increasing network closure. The two neighborhoods shown are a small variation on Figure 1 in Coleman (1988) . With unit link capacities, agent s is connected through 4 paths to the rest of the network in both neighborhoods. In a low value exchange environment, the neighborhood in panel A is more attractive because it provides access to more people. In a high value exchange environment, the neighborhood in panel B is more attractive, because closure allows for borrowing high-valued assets from t1 and t2. NOTE -The …gure is taken from Allcott, Karlan, Mobius, Rosenblat, and Szeidl (2007) . The …gure plots average network closure for students by the number of their friends for schools below median size (solid line) and schools above median size (dashed line). For each student s, closure is measured as P s (2), the share of paths s has to others with whom he has at least two paths, within the circle of trust that includes links up to distance 2 from s. See De…nition 5 and Section 3.1 for details. The …gure is constructed using data from 142 US middle and high schools in the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health; observations with number of friends greater than 19 were excluded (less than 1 percent of total). NOTE -This …gure is a residual plot, controlling for borrower …xed e¤ects, of the relationship between trust ‡ow, measured as time ‡ow, and borrowing, where time ‡ow is the sum of direct and indirect normalized time spent together. The …gure is constructed as follows. For each borrower we calculate mean trust ‡ow with all his/her friends, and de…ne excess trust ‡ow as the deviation from this mean. We similarly construct excess borrowing as the deviation from the average probability of borrowing across all friends. We sort all borrower-lender pairs by excess trust ‡ow, group them into 16 equally sized bins and plot the excess probability of borrowing (vertical axis) against average excess trust ‡ow (horizontal axis) for each bin. Above avg.
Indirect Time
Below avg. NOTE -Each link is classi…ed as weak, medium or strong depending on whether the time spent together lies in lowest third, medium third of top third of the time distribution. Weak, medium and strong total ‡ow is de…ned by noting that each direct and indirect path between borrower and lender makes either a weak, medium or strong contribution to total ‡ow. For indirect medium and strong ‡ow we only count indirect paths. Weak-notweak ‡ow counts paths where exactly one link is weak; medium-strong ‡ow counts paths where one link is medium and one link is strong.
We do not include indirect weak ‡ow in columns (2) and (4) because we cannot separately identify total and indirect weak ‡ow in our conditional logit estimation as every potential lender has at least a weak link to the borrower.
